Rejoinder to "A Challenge to Amaranthine Metaphysics"

Rejoinder To "A Challenge to Amaranthine Metaphysics"

by Helath Haermon

The eminent Altmeri scholar Dume Droven has recently written an article in the Philosophia Metaphysica journal named "A Challenge to Amaranthine Metaphysics". In it, he does precisely that. He offers three arguments he thinks refute the commonly accepted notion of Amaranthine Metaphysics so widely held by Whirling School philosophers. In the Fifth Era, he argues, philosophy should move on from thousands of years of foundation and into new unchartered territory.

Intelligent though he may be, his arguments against Amaranthine metaphysics are far from undefeatable. All three of his arguments either misunderstand the Amaranthine position or use erroneous reasoning to refute them. I will now tackle them one by one.

The Infinite Regress Argument

Dume Droven's first argument claims that Amaranthine metaphysics rests on the unstable ground of an infinite regress. His argument can be put in syllogistic form like so:

  1. If Amaranthine metaphysics requires an infinite regress, then it must be false.

  2. Amaranthine metaphysics requires an infinite regress.

  3. Therefore, Amaranthine metaphysics is false.

Most Whirling School philosophers would heavily dispute premise two of this argument. As Dume himself mentioned, it is possible to get around this objection by holding that there was a first Amaranth. Indeed, that is precisely what most Whirling School philosophers do. The conception of an infinite regression of Amaranths has not dominated the academy since Marcello's excellent book on the subject in the late Fourth Era. Like a blind swordsman aimlessly swiping his sword at thin air, Dume is attacking a position that scarcely even exists. Amaranthine metaphysics does not need an infinite regress and does not claim such a thing. The Infinite Regress Argument strikes a nonexistent target.

The Counterintuitive Functionality Argument

Dume's second argument is that the world does not function like a dream and therefore probably is not a dream. He claims that this is a sound inductive argument against the dream conception of reality, and by corollary, an argument against Amaranthine metaphysics. He summarizes it like so:

  1. If the universe works contrary to the common experience of dreams, it is unlikely to be a dream.

  2. The universe works contrary to the common experience of dreams.

  3. Therefore, the universe is unlikely to be a dream.

The same charge levied against the Infinite Regress Argument can be leveraged against the Counterintuitive Functionality Argument. It misses the point. Dreaming is a metaphor to describe the phenomenon of the world we live in, not a claim that the world is literally a dream.

Even so, there are many scholars who hold that the world is actually a divine dream. I count myself among their number. We can easily dispute premise two of this argument, because this world does frequently behave in a dream-like fashion. The presence of mythopoeic effects has been an established fact for at least two hundred years now. What else can describe the alteration of physical reality by belief except the conclusion that reality is in some way unreal? And if it is unreal, then the best description of such a world is a dream. This argument could be further developed, but the picture is clear enough. There are not sufficient grounds to argue that the universe is not a dream.

The Dubious Witness Argument

Lastly, Dume presents the Dubious Witness argument in which he seeks to overturn thousands of years of scholarship on Padomaic philosophy. He seeks to invalidate the core concepts of Amaranthine metaphysics-CHIM, Divine Dream Reality, and the Walking Ways- by attacking the credibility of the chief teacher of them: Vivec.

He presents it like this:

  1. If a witness is malicious or insane, the witness' word cannot be trusted.

  2. Vivec was either malicious or insane.

  3. Therefore, Vivec's word cannot be trusted.

Once more, this argument misses its mark. Padomaic philosophy does not stand or fall on the credibility of Vivec. Whether Vivec was an insane murderer or a warrior poet with an acute analytical mind is irrelevant. The concepts he presents in his Thirty Six Lessons clearly have some basis in reality. Who can deny that the Walking Ways are viable methods of apotheosis? Who can deny, having seen the unfortunate victims of zero-summing, that CHIM is not possible? The many outside witnesses for these events provide outside support for Vivec's testimony that makes up for his lack of credibility.

Dume is a smart Mer but his Neostatic Transcendentalist bias is bleeding into his scholarship. He has not presented any good reason to throw away four eras of scholarship, and until he does, Amaranthine Metaphysics remain a viable philosophy.